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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Low-income families with children receive largetax benefits from the
Earned Income Tax Credit, while high-incometaxpayers receive large tax
benefits from dependent exemptions (whose valueis greater to those in
higher tax brackets). In contrast, middle-incomeparents receive substan-
tially smaller tax benefits associated with children. ThisU-shaped pattern
of benefits by income, which we call the middle-classparent penalty, not
only raises issues of fairness; it also generates marginaltax rates and
marriage penalties for moderate-income families thatare as high or higher
than those facing more well-to-do taxpayers. Thispaper documents how
the tax benefits of children vary with income, and illustratestheir effect on
marginal tax rates and marriage penalties. It thenexamines five options
for reducing or eliminating the middle-classparent penalty and the high
marginal tax rates and marriage penalties it produces.
We thank Robert Cherry, Janet Holtzblatt, Michael Laracy, JamesPoterba, Wendell
Primus, Max Sawicky, Isabel Sawhill, and participants in the NBERChildren's Program
meeting and an Anne E. Casey working groupon working families for helpful sugges-
tions. Ellwood is grateful to the MacArthur Foundation, and Liebmanto the Russell Sage
Foundation, for generous financial support.2Ellwood & Liebman
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade tax benefits forfamilies with children have in-
creased by roughly 75 percent, due to expansionsin the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) and the introductionof the child tax credit. Some of
the tax benefits associated with children,such as the child tax credit and
the dependent care tax credit, aregenerally non-refundable and thus
benefit only those who owe taxes. Similarly, the$2,750-per-child depen-
dent exemption is of value only to thosewith positive tax liability, and
its value rises with a taxpayer's marginal tax rate.By contrast, the EITC
is refundable and targeted on low-incomefamilies.
The combination of the highly targetedand refundable EITC and the
non-refundable credits and exemptions creates asituation where the tax
benefits from children are much higher forlow- and high-income par-
ents than for middle-income parents.Middle-income parents, who earn
too much to qualify for much EITCand too little to gain much benefit
from the other tax-linked benefits, mightbe said to face a kind of middle-
class parent penalty relative to their poorerand richer counterparts.
This middle-class parent penalty notonly raises issues of fairness; it
also generates marginal tax rates and marriagepenalties for moderate-
income families that are as high or higherthan those facing more well-to-
do taxpayers. Marginal tax rates (includingpayroll taxes) for two-parent
families can reach 50 percent or more amongfamilies with incomes near
$30,000. And for parents in the same income rangethe marriage penalty
can, in some cases, exceed$2,000.
This paper documents how the tax benefitsfrom children vary with
income and illustrates their effect onmarginal tax rates and marriage
penalties. It then examines alternativeproposals for reducing or elimi-
nating the middle-class parent penalty andthe high marginal tax rates
and marriage penalties it produces. Assumingthat policymakers would
be reluctant to cut back support forlow-income working parents, any
correction would necessarily involve providing moretax-based support
for middle-income parents, and that wouldrequire additional revenue.
But in a context where tax cuts of varioussorts are being widely dis-
cussed, strategies that provide greater supportfor middle-income work-
ing families while improving workand marriage incentives for low- and
moderate-income parents are worth examining.
2. U.S. TAX BENEFITS FORPARENTS
The U.S. federal income tax code haslong offered extra benefits for
families and children. Some benefits arepotentially available to all fami-The Middle-Class Parent Penalty3
lies with children so longas their income is in the appropriate range.
These benefits include theEITC,the dependent exemption, and the
child tax credit. Others are linkedto specific expenditures such as the
credit for child and dependentcare expenses, flexible spending accounts
for child care, theHOPEScholarship tax credit, and education IRAs.At
least one is linked to family statustheseparate schedule for head-of-
household filers. Still othersare more implicit, such as the home mort-
gage interest deduction, which presumably providesgreater benefits to
those with greater housing needs. OnlytheEITCand a small portion of
the additional child credit for familieswith three or more childrenare
refundable, so none of the others advantagepeople who would not owe
taxes in the absence of these tax provisions.
This combination of policies makes fora complicated tax code and tax
form. Adding to this complexity is thefact that different definitions of
"child" are used in determining eligibilityfor the provisions. We begin
by briefly reviewing these benefits.
2.1 Earned Income Tax Credit
TheEITCwas introduced in 1975, in part as a way to offset thepayroll
taxes that low-income taxpayers mustpay. It is fully refundable. Over
the years it has been expanded considerably.Today it is often seenas a
way of ensuring that working families are notpoor. Indeed, the latest
increase in theEITCwas designed explicitly to ensure that a family of
four with one full-time minimum-wageworker would avoid poverty
through a combination of earnings, foodstamps, and theEITC.1Since
1986, benefits and other programparameters have been adjusted for
inflation. Children qualifya taxpayer for theEITCif they live in the
taxpayer's household for at least 6 months of theyear, and they must be
the natural child, stepchild, adopted child,or foster child of the tax-
payer, and be under 19 (or under 24 if a full-time student,or any age if
the child is permanently and totally disabled).
TheEITChas a phase-in, a plateau, anda phaseout. During the phase-
in, each dollar in earnings is matched byanEITCequal to 34 percent of
earnings for a family with one child, and 40percent for a family with two
or more children. As income rises, the credit reaches itsmaximum of
$2,312 for a family with one childor $3,816 for a family with two or more
children in 1999. It remains at that plateaulevel until family income
reaches $12,460, at which point it is phasedout at a rate of 15.98 percent
for families with one child and 21.06percent for families with two or
more children. The effect of theEITCon marginal tax rates thus depends
'Ellwood (1996).4Eliwood & Liebman
on where one islocated in the income spectrum. Itsharply reduces
marginal tax rates in the phase-in, has noeffect in the plateau range, and
raises rates in the phaseout.
2.2 Dependent Exemption
The dependent exemption isdeducted from family income before calcu-
lating taxes. In 1999 it equaled$2,750 per dependent. Although it is now
inflation-adjusted, its value relative to percapita income has shrunk
from 42 percent in 1946 toroughly 10 percent in recent years.2The
exemption begins to phase outslowly (0.8 percent per $1,000), starting
at roughly $190,000 inadjusted gross income for married couplesand
$160,000 for single heads ofhousehold. The dependent exemption is
available for any child under 19 and anyfull-time student under 24 for
whom the family provides overhalf of the support,3 regardless of how
long the dependent lived in thehousehold.
Because the exemption reducestaxable income, its value naturally in-
creases with marginal taxrates until it begins to phase out.For someone
who otherwise owes no taxes it isworthless. For those in the 15-percent
bracket it is worth $413; for those inthe 28-percent bracket it is worth $770;
for those in the 36-percent bracket,which begins at $159,000 for a married
couple, it is worth $990 in tax savings.Unless the exemption moves a
family into a lower tax bracket, ithas no effect on marginal tax rates.
2.3 Child Tax Credit
The child tax credit was adopted in1997. Families receive a tax credit of
$500 for each qualifying child.A qualifying child is a naturalchild,
stepchild, adopted child, or fosterchild who is under 17 and for whom
the family can claim a dependentexemption. The credit is not refund-
able for families with fewer thanthree children. For those with three or
more children, it isrefundable to the extent that the employeeportion of
payroll taxes exceeds the refundableportion of the EITC. The credit is
phased out at a rate of $50 per $1,000of income, starting at $110,000 for
married taxpayers and $75,000 forunmarried heads of households. The
benefit and limits are not indexed toinflation.
The value of the credit is equal to$500 per child or the family's tax
liability if it is less than $500 perchild (unless the family has morethan
three children, in which case it becomespartially refundable). Except for
high-income taxpayers subject to thecredit's phaseout, it does not alter
2McIntyre and Steuerle (1996). Whittington,Ahn, and Peters (1990) present evidencethat
U.S. fertility rates have responded to thelevel of the dependent exemption.
It is also available for others whose grossincome is below the exemption amount.The Middle-Class Parent Penalty5
marginal tax rates at all (unless it pullspeople into a range where they
owe no taxes).
2.4 Dependent Care Credit
The dependent care tax credit originatedin 1954 and has gone through
many changes. Currently it providesa credit of up to 30 percent for
allowable dependentcare expenses for children under 13. Allowable
expenses are limited to $2,400 for families withone dependent and
$4,800 for two or more. Benefitsare reduced by half a percentage point
for each dollar of income above$10,000, but never fall below 20percent
of allowable costs.4 The credit isnot refundable. Limits are not indexed
to inflation.
The benefit of this creditgenerally will be 20 percent of childcare
expenses up to a maximum benefit of $960 fortwo children. It benefits
only those with positive tax liabilities.It has no effect on marginaltax
rates unless people are moved intoa zero tax range.
2.5 Employer-Provided DependentCare
The value of certain employer-paiddependent care expenses ofup to
$5,000 are also excludable from income.This includes both actualcare
provided directly in the workplace, whichis rare, and flexible spending
accounts, which are much more common.5Under a flexible spending
account, employees have the option of placingup to $5,000 in pre-tax
income in an employer-sponsoredaccount. This money is then dis-
bursed by the employer to reimbursefor qualifying childcare expenses
paid by the employee. Suchaccounts are uncommon in small firms, but
in medium to large firms theyare often part of a flexible set of benefits.
According to the 1998 Green Book,slightly over one-third of full-time
employees in medium- to large-sizeestablishments were eligible for
these accounts in 1991.6 Expensescovered by flexible spendingaccounts
reduce dollar for dollar theamount of expenses eligible for the depen-
dent care tax credit. This benefitdoes not phase out at higher incomes.7
Like any deduction, the value of thisprovision depends on the tax rate
of the family. It is worth nothingto those with no income, andup to
' Because the dependentcare credit phases out so early, and given the othernon- refundable credits like the child tax credit, underthe current tax rules, the net gain of the dependent care credit rarely is muchgreater than the minimum 20 percent for taxpayers with children.
Committee on Ways and Means (1998,p. 878).
6Ibid., p. 878.
Gentry and Hagy (1996) discuss the distributionof child-care tax benefits.6Ellwood & Liebman
$1,800 for those in the 36-percent taxbracket. It alters marginal rates only
if taxpayers are moved to a lowerbracket.
For low-income households,the dependent care tax credit isusually
more valuable thanthe flexible spending account. Afamily in the
15-percent tax bracket with twochildren is eligible for a tax creditof
between 20 and 30 percent on up to$4,800 of dependent care ex-
penses; the credit istherefore potentially worth between$960 and
$1,440. In contrast, the opportunity toexclude $5,000 in expenses
through a flexible spending account isworth only $750 to a taxpayer in
the 15-percent tax bracket. For a taxpayerin the 28-percent bracket the
relative attractiveness of the twopolicies is reversed. The dependent
care tax credit isworth 20 percent of the first $4,800of expenses, or
$960, while the opportunity toexclude $5,000 of expenses from income
is worth $1,400.
2.6 Education Benefits
There are a number ofeducation-related tax benefits. In 1997,the HOPE
credits were established. Theyprovide a 100-percent credit forthe first
$1,000 in qualifying educational expensesand 50% for the next $1,000.
They are available for expensesonly in the first two yearsof post-
secondary education. After 2001, thecredit will be indexed to inflation.8
The lifetime learning credit allows a20-percent credit of up to $5,000 in
qualifying educational expenses. There is alifetime limit on the credit of
$2,000. There is no limit on age orrelationship. Both the HOPE and
lifetime learning credit are phasedout over the range of$80,000 to
$100,000 of income for joint filers and$40,000 to $50,000 for single filers.
Parents and grandparents canplace money in an education IRAfor
children. Neither the contributions northe disbursements are taxed, so
long as the money is usedfor a qualifying educational institution.The
maximum contribution is $500 per year.The contribution allowance is
phased out starting at $150,000 forjoint returns and $95,000 forothers.
Qualified state tuition savings plans arealso tax-exempt.
2.7 Head-of-Household FilingStatus
There are three primary ffling statuses:married ffling jointly, head of
household, and single. As is well known, taxschedules and deductions
are such that for a givenlevel of taxable income, taxes arelowest for joint
filers, higher for heads ofhouseholds, and highest for single persons,
8Dynarski (2000) finds that Georgia's HOPEScholarship, the inspiration for the new
federal Hope Scholarship, increased thecollege attendance rate of middle- andhigh-
income youth, but widened the collegeattendance gap between blacks and whitesand
between those from low- and high-incomefamilies.The Middle-Class Parent Penalty7
but the tax brackets for couplesare less than twice those of singles.9
Marriage puts people into joint filingstatus, so the benefits or costs of
filing joint returns are not tied directlyto the presence of childrenper se.
But in the case of head-of-household filers,it is often the presence of
children that puts them into the filingcategory. Whether the parent is
divorced or never married, heor she would be in a less favorable tax
status without children.
In some cases, however, eligibility for thehead-of-household status is
not dependent on the presence of children.Some heads of households
with children are also living with otherrelatives or grown children,so at
the margin, the children do notcreate the benefit. Moreover, one might
argue that the lower tax rates of one-earner joint filers(relative to filing
separate single returns) similarly reflecta recognition that married cou-
ples wifi generally have children andneed to set up a household,even
though, technically, joint filing statusis tied to marriage, not parenting.
Still, if we ask the simple question "Howmuch benefit does being able
to file as a head of household yield?" theanswer is sizable. In the case of
a single parent, the head-of-household status allows her$2,050 more in
the standard deduction and bettertax brackets than if she filedas a
single adult. The benefits of beinga head-of-household filer versus a
single filer rise with income, from $308 forsomeone with an income of
$20,000 to $3,500 and more for thesmall group of single parents with
incomes above $150,000 annually.
2.8 Other Tax Benefits
The mortgage interest deduction also offerssome benefits for children.
Families with children may spendmore on housing, thus gaining greater
tax benefits. The deductibility of employer-paidhealth insurance premi-
ums and excess health expenses, the linkage betweenmany state taxes
and federal provisions, andeven the deductibility of state and local taxes
all influence the benefits associated withchildren. Nearly all of these
typically grow with income, largely becausethe benefits to deductions
are greatest when marginal tax rates are highest.
2.9 The Budgetary Cost of Child Benefits
Table 1 shows the relative magnitude ofthe main child-related tax provi-
sions in terms of the revenue loss forthe federal income tax.1° Lost
In two-earner households, the taxes of joint filersmay be higher or lower than they
would be if persons with the same income had filedseparatelyhence this is one source of marriage penalties and rewards.
10The cost of tax expenditures in these calculations isonly the cost in federal income taxes.
Some of these provisions reduce a taxpayer'spayroll taxes as well.8Eliwood & Liebman
TABLE 1
Budgetary Cost of Selected Tax Benefitsfor Families
with Children, F1' 2001
Benefit type Cost ($billions)
Dependent exemption












Sources: Dependent exemption andhead-of-household filing status are
based on authors' calculations from 1995 sal taxfile, inflated to 2001
dollars. The remaining numbers are from Table 5-1of Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (2000). Tax expendituresreflect effect on federal income
tax revenue only (not OASDHI).
revenue from exemptionsfor dependent children wifi totalaround $34
biffion in 2001, more than any otherchild-associated tax benefit. The
EITC is expected to cost $31 billion inFl 2001, and the child credit$20
billion. The other provisions aremuch smaller. Allowing taxpayers to
file with the head-of-householdfiling status instead of filing assingle
costs $4 billion dollars. Thetotal cost of the dependent care creditand
the tax expenditure foremployer-provided child care is only $3 billion.
3. THE CUMULATIVEEFFECT OF THE VARIOUS
CHILD TAX BENEFITS
The rather obvious insight fromthis discussion is that the tax code
provides relatively sizable tax benefits tolow- and high-income families
with childrenthe former throughthe EITC, the latter through tax bene-
fits that tend to rise with income, atleast to a point. For the group in the
middle income range, tax benefits aremuch smaller. Yet this feature has
been emphasized by only a fewauthors. Eugene Steuerle has focused
particular attention on child tax-codeprovisions, often adding the com-
plication that the interaction of the taxcode with provisions of the trans-
fer system creates skewed andcomplex incentives.11 Perhaps the most
important work that focuses on theU-shaped benefit pattern has been
done by Robert Cherry (1998) and morerecently as part of significant
See for example Steuerle (1990), Steuerleand Juffras (1990), and Mcintyre and Steuerle
(1996).TABLE 2
Tax Benefits Associated with Having Two Children:Married Couple for
Tax Year 1999
The Middle-Class Parent Penalty9
(a) Assumes couple spends 5 percent of income on allowable childcare and both children are depen-
dent children under 17.
new work with Max Sawicky.12 In addition, these authors haverecently
proposed an expansion to the EITC somewhat similarto an option be-
low. This paper extends this work, illustratingin detail the actual inci-
dence of the various child tax benefits,examining impacts of a range of
reform proposals, and estimating costs and effects fromactual tax data.
The current situation can be illustrated with thefollowing example.
Suppose that a married couple has two dependentchildren living at
home and that the couple pays 5 percent of its incomein allowable child
care expenses. Table 2 illustrates the couple's net tax benefits from hav-
ing children from the four most important child-linkedbenefits. In de-
composing the total tax benefits from individualprovisions, one must
order the benefits. In the situation where the combinedvalue of various
non-refundable child benefits exceeds the totaltax liability of the family
without them, taxes fall to zero, and there isambiguity as to which
benefit to treat as having reduced the liability first.In such a case, we
attribute benefits first to the dependent exemption andthen to the child
tax credit (since these two tax benefitsare available for nearly every
child), and finally to the dependent-care tax credit.
The treatment of the dependent-care credit is ambiguous,since these
benefits depend on expenditures. Itseems unlikely that a family with
$30,000 would spend the $4,800 necessary to gain the fullbenefits. Thus
for this example we have assumed that families'child care expenses
grow with income. We assume a expenditure equal to 5percent of in-
come; families with two children do not get the full benefit of thecredit
until their spending reaches $4,800 ($96,000 inincome in this example).
Different assumptions would yield different results fromthis credit.
12Cherry and Sawicky (2000).
Benefit type
Benefit at Family Income ($)a
12,000 20,000 35,000 75,000
Earned Income Tax Credit 3,816 2,228 0 0 Dependent child exemptions 0 825 825 1,540 Child tax credit 0 270 1,000 1,000
Dependent Care Tax Credit 0 0 350 750
Total 3,816 3,332 2,175 3,29010Bliwood & Liebman
Families with two children and $12,000 of incomequalify for the full
EITC of $3,816. A family with $20,000has a reduced EITC, and gets only
partial benefits from the other child taxprovisions, because the family
would owe relatively little in taxes, so itsbenefits total $3,332. A couple
with $35,000 receives even less. Thatcouple gets no EITC, and even with
the full benefit of the tax provisions,the total tax benefits from children
fall to under $2,200. Then for familieswith incomes of $75,000 the benefit
rises again to $3,290, since the dependentexemptions are worth more to
a family in the 28-percentbracket than to one in the 15-percent bracket.
These figures would be even moredramatic if the higher-income fam-
ily could get its child care paidthrough an employer-sponsored flexible
spending accountthat would add $300.Other tax benefits cited above,
such as higher-education credits, are also morelikely to benefit the well-
to-do, not only because they are morelikely to be eligible for them, but
also because they are often in the formof a deduction whose value is
greater for those in higher brackets.Several authors have shown that
children from higher-income families arefar more likely to go onto post-
secondary schooling than low-income familiesare.13
One can see how these benefits play out over amuch wider range of
incomes and for several differentfamily settings in Figures 1 to 5. Fig-
ures 1 to 3 are formarried couples with different numbersof children.
Figure 4 is for a head-of-householdfiler with two children where we do
not include the potential valueof the head-of-household status, because
it is an ambiguous child benefit.Then in Figure 5 we include the value of
the head-of-household filing status onthe assumption that the person
would have filed as a single taxpayer inthe absence of the two children.
In most of our subsequent work wedo not include the value of this
head-of-household designation as a child benefit.
We wifi concentrate on Figure 2, the taxbenefits associated with two
children for a married couple. Married taxpayersfiling joint returns
account for 64 percent of all tax returnsclaiming child tax benefits and
claim almost 70 percent of all dependentchild exemptions.14 The total
tax benefit associated withchildren is decomposed into its four main
components for a married couple with twochildren. The EITC is the
main benefit for taxpayers with incomesbelow $25,000 or so. The value
of the dependent exemption rises from$825 in the 15-percent tax bracket
to $1,540 in the 28-percentbracket, and $1,705 in the 31-percent bracket.
13 See for example Eliwood and Kane (2000) and Cameron and Heckman(1999).
14 Among lower-income taxpayers (those with AGI below $40,000),married taxpayers filing
joint returns represent only 44 percent of taxpayersclaiming children, though they claim 50








FIGURE 1. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having One Child-
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FIGURE 2. 1999 Tax Benefits Associatedwith Having Two Children-
Married Couples under Current Law,Assuming Child Care Expense of
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FIGURE 3. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having Three
Children-Married Couples under CurrentLaw, Assuming Child Care
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FIGURE 4. Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having TwoChildren-
Unmarried Adult under Current Law,Ignoring Change in Filing Status,
and Assuming Child Care Expenseof 5 Percent of IncomeThe Middle-Class Parent Penalty13
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FIGURE 5. 1999 Tax Benefits Associatedwith Having Two Children
Unmarried Adult under Current Law, IncludingValue of Head-of-
Household Filing Status and Assuming ChildCare Expenses of 5 Per-
cent of Income
The value of the child tax credit isconstant at $1,000 for this familyonce
tax liabilities are positive. However, thechild credit is phased out for
households with income above $110,000($75,000 for single heads), and
therefore the total tax benefits to childrenfall above this income level.15
In all of the figures, the largest benefitstend to be concentrated in the
$10,000-to-$12,000 income range and the$75,000-to-$100,000 range. At
times the tax benefits rise and fallrapidly. Figure 3, for families with
three children, is particularly strik'ing.The sudden blip at roughly
$30,000 is caused by the quasi-refundablenature of the child tax credit
(refundable up to the point where thecredit plus the EITC equals payroll
taxes) for families with threeor more children.
The figures indicate that thepattern varies widely across families, and
even these comparatively simple plots mask considerablygreater com-
plexity and variation in actualpractice. Because of the significant
number of contingent benefitsthoseavailable only to people withpar-
ticular costs such as higher educationor child carechild benefits vary
considerably even for people with thesame incomes. Moreover, the
definition of a qualifying child variesconsiderably across programsfor
15A phaseout of dependent exemptionsoccurs beyond the income level shown in this
figure (between $189,950 and $312,450 formarried couples).
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example, the EITC is available only tothose for whom a child lived in
the home for more than 6months, while the dependentexemption is
based on a dependency test,independent of residence.
4. THE OBSERVEDINCIDENCE OF CHILDBENEFITS
In order to examine theactual effect of these provisionsand to gain a
greater sense of what thedistribution of child tax benefits lookslike in
practice, we analyzed child taxbenefits using a sample of tax returns.
Specifically, we used the IRS Statisticsof Income 1995 Public Use Tax
File. This data set is representativeof all individual income tax returns
filed for tax year 1995. Because wewant our results to be representative
of more recent tax rules, weaged the data to better represent1999
conditions by increasing all incomecomponents at the growth rateof
personal income between 1995 and1999. Then we applied 1999 taxrules
to the data.
One detail of our methodologydeserves further discussion. Thechild
credit was not in place in 1995, so wedo not observe the numberof
children a taxpayer is entitled toclaim for the child credit. Wedo have
information on the number ofchildren claimed for the dependent exemp-
tion and the EITC. But onlychildren under age 17 can be claimedfor the
child tax credit, whereas children upto age 24 who are full-time stu4ents
can qualify for thedependent exemption.'6 In ourmarginal-tax-rate simu-
lations, we assume that a taxpayer canclaim the child credit for any
dependent child, though this clearlywill lead to us assigning thecredit
for some dependent childrenwho are 17 and older. However, weadjust
our cost estimates to ensurethat the right number of returnsreceive the
child credit. We do not examinethe education tax credits, becausethey
did not exist in 1995; nor do weexamine the credit for employer-
provided child care, because we cannotobserve it in our data.17
Figure 6 shows the distributionof tax returns with children by income
(kernel density estimates). The toppanel shows the distribution of the
27.0 million married tax returnsclaiming children. The bottompanel
shows the distribution of the13.6 million head-of-household returns
claiming children (another 2 millionreturns claim children usingother
filing statuses). These figuresshow that while the bulkof head-of-
household taxpayers with childrenhave adjusted gross incomesbe-
16Even older children with earningsbelow $2750 in 1999 can be claimed asdependent
children, though this is a very small group.
' Mitrusi and Poterba (2000) construct a similar modelthat includes imputations of educa-
tion tax credits.I
0.00002
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tween $10,000 and $30,000, married taxpayerswith children are distrib-
uted across a much wider incomerange, with substantial numbers of
taxpayers having incomes above $50,000 (resultsnot shown indicate that
the average number of childrenper tax return does not vary much with
income within a filing status). Theaverage head-of-household tax return
has roughly 1.53 children, and theaverage married tax return has 1.94
children).
Figure 7 depicts the average tax benefitto claiming children by in-
come, and decomposes this average into the four maintax provisions.
Thus, this figure is analogous to Figures1 to 5. But instead of showing
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FIGURE 7. Average Tax Benefits fromChildren by AGI, All Taxpayers
with Children
average benefit receivedfor families at different levels ofadjusted gross
income (AGI). The estimates inthe figure average across all of the tax
returns at a given level ofAGIhouseholds that will receivedifferent
benefits because they have differentnumbers of children, different tax
schedules due to different filing statuses,differences in itemized deduc-
tions, etc.18 The actual distributionis quite similar to the theoretical
distribution. Taxpayers with around$15,000 of income have the highest
benefits, due to the EITC. Benefitsthen fall for taxpayers in the 15-
percent income tax bracket andrise for higher-income taxpayers. Note
that in calculating these figures we did notinclude the potential value of
the head-of-household status.
Figure 8 depicts the distribution oftotal dollars from these four provi-
sions by AGI, essentially weightingthe average tax benefits in the previ-
ous figure by the numberof tax returns at each level of AGI.Although
high-income taxpayers get large averagebenefits, this figure shows that
relatively few dollars are spent on them,since there are relatively few
taxpayers with high incomes.In fact, because of their large numbers,
18The figures depict kernel regressions of taxbenefits on AGI.Dlsttlbutlon of Dollars from Child Benefits
The Middle-Class Parent Penalty17
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FIGURE 8. Distribution of Dollars Spenton Child Benefits by AGI
more total dollars are spent on the middle-income familieswho face the
parent penalty than on higher-income families.
Generally these benefits look much like whatone might predict based
on the figures shown earlier. One interesting fact is thatat all income
levels, dependent-care creditsare quite small on average, though they
are undoubtedly highly variable. Thus for the remainingdiscussion in
this paper, we wifi concentrateon the child benefits of the EITC,
the dependent-child exemption, and thechild credit, and ignoreany
dependent-care or other child-related tax benefits.
5. THE EFFECT OF CHILD TAXBENEFITS ON TAX
RATES AND WORK INCENTIVES
Considerable attention has been devotedto discussions of marginal tax
rates and marriage penalties in recentyears. Most of the attention has
been directed at the traditional featuresof the tax code: notably the
brackets, the tax rates, and the differentialtreatment of married and
single people. Yet the child tax benefits sharplyinfluence marginal rates
and marriage incentives, and for lowerincome tax filers, their impor-



















Marginal Rates With Two Children
Family Income
FIGURE 9. Marginal Income Tax Ratefor Married Couple with Two
Children under Current Law AsCompared to a Couple with No Chil-
dren (No Allowable Child CareExpenses)
Figure 9 compares marginalpersonal income tax rates for amarried
couple with two children and amarried couple without children.19 The
child-linked tax benefits clearly complicatethe comparatively simple pic-
ture of incentives facingchildless couples. Any time childbenefits are
rising with income they lowermarginal rates, and vice versa. For the
lowest-income taxpayers, theEITC has the effect of makingmarginal
income tax rates highly negative,thus creating strong work incentives.
For a family with two children theEITC provides a 40-percent credit over
a range in whichother federal income taxes are zero,effectively raising
pay by 40 percent.Later, after income gets to about$12,500, the credit is
phased out at a 21-percent rate. Duringpart of the phaseout, the family
faces no ordinary taxes (as thedependent exemption and child credit
offset any taxes), so the tax rate is 21percent. Then one reaches a point
where all the exemptions and creditshave been exhausted, but the EITC
is still phasing out, so themarginal income tax rate jumps to 36 percent
(21-percent phaseout plus 15-percent taxrate). Above the EITC phase-
out range, rates largely mirrorthe regular tax rates until the childcredit
begins phasing out at $110,000, pushing upmarginal rates again.
Table 3 shows the actual distributionof marginal federal income tax
rates for taxpayers withchildren at various income levels, usingthe IRS
'9This figure is drawn assuming that taxpayerstake the standard deduction and that all
income is earned income.
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Statistics of Income 1995Public Use Tax File andaged as described
earlier. Seventy percent of taxpayerswith AGI below $10,000 face nega-
tive marginal tax ratesbecause of the phase-inof the EITC, while nearly
all of the remaining 30 percentface zero marginal tax rates.At incomes
between $10,000 and$20,000, a substantialnumber of taxpayers face
high marginal rates. Thirty-onepercent face marginal tax ratesbetween
20 percent and 30 percent(taxpayers who are inthe phaseout region of
the EITC but owe nofederal income tax), and 14percent face marginal
income tax rates above30 percent (taxpayerswho are in the phaseout
region of the EITC and owefederal income tax).
Between $20,000 and$30,000, 37 percent facemarginal tax rates
above 30 percent. Incontrast, essentially no taxpayerswith incomes
between $30,000 and$75,000 face marginal tax ratesabove 30 percent.
It is not until incomesexceed $100,000 that asubstantial share of tax-
payers facemarginal tax rates as high asthose faced by taxpayers
between $15,000 and$30,000. Indeed, of all taxpayerswith children
facing marginal tax ratesabove 30 percent, 55 percenthave incomes
below $30,000.
Note that these rates arenot the full effective taxrates on earnings.
First, they do notinclude payroll taxes of 7.65percent for employeesand
the same for employers.If we add the full 15.3-percenttaxes on top of
these rates, marginal tax ratesexceed 50 percent for couplesjust below
$30,000. Nor do they includestate taxes. And finally, manylow-income
families also qualify forfood stamps, temporaryassistance for needy
families (TANF),government-provided medical insurance,and the like.
As earnings rise, suchbenefits fall, effectivelypushing up marginal tax
rates stifi further.
A major thrust of policyin recent years has been toreduce the trans-
fers to low-incomefamilies without workers andexpand supports for
working ones. Dramaticexpansions in the EITC,changes in welfare
policy, and expanded supportsfor low-income workingfamilies have all
served to radically alterincentives facing low-incomefamilies.20 Eliwood
(2000) shows that a womanwith two children wholeft welfare for full-
time work at a minimum-wagejob used to face an effective taxon her
earnings of nearly 80 percentin 1986 when one tookaccount of taxes and
lost benefits. By 1999,mostly as a result of theexpanded EITC, the tax
rate was below 30 percent.
Numerous authors includingEissa and Liebman(1996), Blank, Card,
and Robbins (2000), Meyerand Rosenbaum (1999),and Ellwood (2000),
have found large growthin the labor supplyof single parents over this
20See for example, Eissa and Hoynes(1999b) and Blank, Card, andRobbins (2000).The Middle-Class Parent Penalty21
period, and all show thata significant share of the growth in work by
single mothers can be traced toexpansions in the EITC.
On the other hand,as the earlier figure would suggest, taxrates went
in the other direction in famifieswhere income was already ata modest level. So, for a married motherwhose husband earned $15,000, the
effective tax rate for takinga full-time job rose from 53 to 66percent between 1986 and 1999. Somewhatless work has been doneon the
changing labor supply patternsof low- to moderate-incomemarried
women, but both Eissa and Hoynes (1999a) andEllwood (2000) find that
this rise in tax rates reduced thelabor supply of low-incomemarried
women.21 There is still less workon whether the high marginal tax rates
in this range influence the earnings offirst earners. Presumably both
single parents and persons in one-workerhouseholds could be induced
to limit hours or earningsas a result of the high marginal rates, though
the evidence so far does not findmuch effect.22 Thus there isa significant
and growing body of evidence thatthe incentives created by childtax
benefits do influence the behaviorof at least some workers.
6. THE EFFECT OF THE CHILDTAX BENEFITS ON
MARRIAGE PENALTIES ANDREWARDS
Recently policymakers also have becomeoccupied with the marriagepen-
alties found in the federal taxstructure. In political and evenmany aca-
demic discussions, the origins of suchpenalties are usually traced to the
features of our tax system thatprovide for different standard deductions
and tax schedules dependingon a taxpayer's filing status. The standard
deduction for a married couplecan penalize marriage among two-earner
couples because the joint deductionis less than twice the deduction
for single individuals. In addition,the tax brackets for joint filersare wider
than for a single individual, butnot twice as wide. As a result, couples
where only one person has earningsgenerally benefit from joint filing
status, but those with twoearners with nearly equal incomesare dis-
advantaged. These issuesare now widely understood and heavily dis-
cussed in tax policy.23
Less widely understood is the factthat the child tax benefits have
important implications for marriagepenalties among couples with chil-
21The reduction in labor supply by marriedwomen in response to the EITC does not
represent deadweight loss if it is the income effect thatinduces the secondary earners to leave the labor force. (See Liebman, 1998, fora discussion.)
See Liebman (1998).
23See Aim, Dickert-Coliri, and Whittington(1999) for an excellent review.22Ellwood & Liebman
dren and that their effects candwarf the traditional tax-bracketaspects.24
There is no one right way tocalculate marriage penalties, because one
cannot infer whether earningswould change if the couple weremarried
versus unmarried orwho would get custody ofthe children. But if one
assumes that all of thechildren would live with one ofthe parents in the
event that the couple were notmarried and that earnings of eachparent
would remain unchanged, theeffects of the child tax credits onmarriage
are easy to illustrate.
Married couples wifi generally have morecombined income than the
custodial parent would alone,simply because another potential earner
has been added to thehousehold. If so, a married couplewifi be further
along the income spectrumthan a single parent would be.Comparing
the child benefits at the incomeof the single parent alonewith those
available at the combined incomeof the couple shows the effectof child
benefits on marriage incentives.
If a custodial parent of twochildren with zero earnings(relying on
welfare) marries a single manwith $12,000 in earnings, thecouple will
gain nearly $4,000 in childtax benefits, all fromthe EITC. At her
previous zero earnings, there are nochild tax benefits. At $12,000,the
family gets the full EITC. Ineffect, her children and his earningsallow
them to qualify for the EITC.Indeed, for mothers with noearnings,
there always wifi be sizablemarriage rewards created by the taxbene-
fits for children, because atall income levels above zero,child tax
benefits are sizable.
But if the mother werealready earning $12,000 and shemarried the
same man earning$12,000, child benefits wouldfall by roughly $1,200
and serve as a marriage penalty.At $24,000 the child benefits aresmaller
than at $12,000. In this case,his earnings reduce "her"EITC. In any
region where, by marrying,the mother moves up thechild-benefit scale,
child benefits will be rewardingmarriage. But when thecombined in-
come from marriagepushes her down the benefitschedule, it wifi penal-
ize matrimony. Giventhe large valley in child taxbenefits, and the low
incomes of many working women,it is quite common forchild tax
benefits to lead to sizable marriagepenalties in situations where the
mother is working.
Table 4, which is modeled after atable by Wheaton (1998), illustrates
the tax-based marriagepenalties and rewards for couplesin different
24 Feenberg and Rosen (1995) describe howEITC expansions have increased marriage
penalties.
For a valuable discussion of alternative waysof calculating marriage penalties, seeBull,
Holtzblatt, Nunns, and Rebelein (1999).The Middle-Class Parent Penalty23
TABLE 4
1999 Total Marriage Rewards andPenalties and Marriage Rewards and
Penalties from Child Tax Benefits(in Parentheses)
Notes: Positive numbers indicate marriage rewards;negative numbers, marriage penalties. Total tax rewards or penalties equal change in total tax liabilities.Child-benefit rewards or penalties are the change in the combined value of EITC, dependentexemption, and child tax credit. No dependent-
care benefits are included. It is assumed that each person's incomewill remain unchanged if couple is unmarried, that children will go with wife, and that allpersons use standard deduction.
situations. The couples' combined totalincome is shown on the left
side of the table, arid the share of thatincome earned by the woman is
shown across the top. In constructingthis table, we assumed that all
income is earned income, that both theman's and the woman's earn-
ings would remain unchanged if theywere living separately, that the
woman would retain custody of the children, and thatshe would file
as a head of household and the manas a single taxpayer. We have
ignored any child-care expenses that mightlead to dependent-care cred-
its. These are strong assumptions, but theyhelp to illustrate the under-
lying tax structures.
The table shows the total marriagerewards or penalties, and then in
parentheses it shows the marriagereward or penalty associated with
changing child benefits alone. Asone would expect, in couples where all
the income is earned by theman, there are large marriage rewards. Fora
man earning $20,000 and an unemployedwoman with two children (so
the woman is earning 0percent of their combined income), the tax
system provides a $4,171 reward tomarriageeffectively raising their
income by more than 25 percent. Yet,surprisingly, if the situationwere
Couple's total
income ($)
Marriage reward ($) at percentage of income
earned by woman
I10/U /0 25% 50% 75% 100%
12,000 4,559 2,814 1,092 14 0
(3,816) (2,521) (1,092) (-14) (-435)
20,000 4,171 1,421 1,163 1,400 0
(3,323) (1,323) (-646) (-1,190) (-540)
35,000 2,959 2,140 2,707 1,543 540
(1,825) (-1,675) (-2,190) (-1,026) (0)
50,000 4,909 2,399 1,693 518 651
(1,825) (-2,493) (-1,175) (0) (-715)
75,000 6,536 1,370 1,694 1,382 2,113
(2,540) (-1,399) (715) (0) (0)24Eliwood & Liebmn
reversed and an unemployed man wereto marry a mother with two
children who is earning $20,000 (sothe woman is earning 100 percentof
the income), there are no marriagerewards at all. This result is entirely
due to the treatment of childrenin the tax system. A singleindividual
earning $20,000 would owealmost $2,000 in taxes. But if he were to
marry an unemployedmother of two, he would move tothe joint tax
schedule and qualify for additional child taxbenefits. When the situation
is reversed, the womanwould already be getting the taxbenefits of
children.
By contrast, in cases where theincomes of the parties are moreequal,
there are often large tax penalties.For a couple with $35,000 of income
earned in equal portions, the marriage taxis over $2,700. And interest-
ingly, most of that is caused bythe change in child tax benefitsnotthe
variation in brackets between singlesand couples. Indeed, it is striking
that for couples earning $50,000 orless, where both partners have earn-
ings, a very large share of themarriage penalty or reward isthe result of
the effect on child tax credits, notthe more traditional features ofthe tax
code. Even in couples earning$75,000, when the wife is earning a quar-
ter of the total, the child taxpenalty is sizable.
Just as in the case of marginal tax rates,for lower-income couples, one
cannot think about the totalrewards or penalties to marriageindepen-
dently of the transfer system.Unemployed single mothers can usually
collected TANF, at least for a period,and wifi lose considerable benefits
if they marry. The loss of thesetransfer and welfare benefits almost
always adds additional marriagepenalties. Thus, when the tax code has
marriage rewards, it helps offsetpenalties in the transfer system. When
taxes create penalties, theyexacerbate marriage disincentives. Forwork-
ing couples with incomearound $25,000 the combined marriagepenalty
from the various sources can reach20 percent of disposable income.
Unlike the case for labor-supplyincentives, there is thus far little
evidence that these changing taxincentives have altered marriage behav-
ior in a sizable way. Eliwood(2000) found only limited andambiguous
evidence of any marriage increases inthe group for whom marriage
penalties were reduced, or decreases inmarriage among those for whom
marriage incentives turned morenegative. Dickert-Conlin and Houser
(1999) find little impact of the EITCchanges on female headship.And
Eissa and Hoynes (1999b)find that reductions in marriage penaltieshave
modest effects on marriages amonglow-income women.
Given that child tax benefits createlarge marriage rewards in some
cases, and smaller, butstill sizable, marriage penalties inothers, their
overall behavioral effect is uncertain.Nonetheless, policymakers may beThe Middle-Class Parent Penalty25
troubled by the marriage penalties bothon the basis of fairness and
because of the potential for behavioraleffects in the long run. Especially
at a time when lawmakers are considering relievingmarriage tax penal-
ties in other parts of the tax code, thosecreated by the middle-class
parent penalty seem particularly important.
7. OPTIONS FOR REFORM
There are several possibleways to remove some or all of the high marginal
tax rates and marriage penalties formiddle-income families created by
child benefits. One could cut benefits forlow-income families. This would
have the effect of lowering the income ofrelatively poor families with
children and reducing the incentives forparents to leave welfare for work.
Since the EITC and other workersupports seem to have had a strong
positive effect on work by low-wage singleparents and have helped to
reduce welfare caseloads, sucha policy option seems unlikely to be
adopted. Indeed, most recent developmentsin social policy are moving in
the opposite direction and providinggreater support to working parents
who are poor or near-poor.
The alternative is to fill in allor part of the middle-class valley in child-
linked tax benefits so that middle-class familiesget the same benefits as
the rich and poor. There isan obvious argument of fairness for such a
plan, as well as potentially positive effectson work and marriage incen-
tives. On the other hand, such plans willinevitably involve additional
expenditures. At a time when tax cutsare being widely discussed by
both parties, however, providingmore equal tax benefits for middle-
class families might be considered.
We examine five options for reducing themiddle-class parent penalty
by providing greater support to middle-incomefamilies. All of these are
designed to penalize virtuallyno taxpayer while equalizing child tax
benefits across income groups (and insome cases raising benefits for
some low-income families)
7.1 Option 1: A $1,270-per-Child PartiallyRefundable Tax Credit
for Working Families
Replace the existing child tax credit and thedependent exemption witha
$1,270-per-child partially refundable tax credit(where the refundability
is integrated into the phaseout of theexisting EITC). The credit of $1,270
is chosen because it represents the valueof the existing non-refundable
credit and dependent-child exemption forfamilies in the 28-percent tax




























FIGURE 10. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having Two
ChildrenMarried Couples under Option 1and Current Law ($1,270
Partially Refundable Child Tax Credit)
credit is available). Families with incomesbelow the EITC phasedown
point ($12,500) would simply get theirEITC. The credit above that level
would be refundable, but the maximumrefund would be the EITC or the
child tax credit, whichever is more.26This would preserve the positive
work incentive of the EITC while reducingthe marginal tax rates and
marriage penalties for middle-incomefamilies. The new child tax credit
would be phased down to $1,000 forfamilies with incomes over $110,000
($75,000 for single householdheads) to maintain the current patternof
child tax benefits phasing down forhigh-income taxpayers while still
ensuring that higher-income taxpayerswould be no worse off than un-
der current law.
The effect of this provision on child taxbenefits for a married couple
with two children is illustrated on Figure 10.It essentially is a proposal to
fill in the valley in child benefits between$30,000 and $60,000. Figure 11
compares the marginal tax ratesfaced by married couples with two
children at different incomes under thisproposal with those under cur-
rent law, showing that in theEITC phaseout region marginal tax rates
would fall below 30 percent.
26Any remaining credit could be used to offset taxes,but not to increase the refundable







FIGURE 11. Marginal Tax Rate forMarried Couple with Two Chil-
dren under Option 1 and CurrentLaw ($1,270 Partially Refundable
Child Tax Credit)
7.2 Option 2: Raise the ExistingChild Tax Credit to
$1,000 Per Child
President George W. Bush and othershave proposed raising the childtax
credit to $1,000.27 This plan is illustratedin Figure 12. By itself, suchan increase in the child credit wouldraise the aid that most middle- and
upper-income families receive. It wouldalso reduce the number of taxpay-
ers facing high marginal tax rates (Figure 13) andreduce marriage penal-
ties, because many taxpayers whocurrently face both the EITC phaseout
and the 15-percent federal incometax rate would have their pre-EITCtax liability reduced tozero. But families with two children andincomes
below $33,000 could not take fulladvantage of the benefit, becausethe credit would remain non-refundable;and a sizable middle-classparent penalty would remain.
7.3 Option 3: A $1,770-per-ChildPartially Refundable TaxCredit for Working Families
This plan would be something ofa combination of the first two plans. It
would, in effect, fill in the remainingvalley left from the $1,000 tax credit
President Bush has also suggested phasingit out at much higher incomes and has
proposed other tax changes not relatedto children, which we do not simulate here.
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FIGURE 12. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having Two
ChildrenMarried Couples under Option2 and Current Law ($1,000















FIGURE 13. Marginal Tax Ratefor Married Couple with TwoChil-
dren under Option 2 andCurrent Law ($1,000Non-refundable Child
Tax Credit)
DZO Child Tax Credit
Exemption
EITC Benefit

























The Middle-Class Parent Penalty29
EChild Tax Credit
EITC Benefit
Total Child Benefit-Current Law
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FIGURE 14. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having Two
ChildrenMarried Couples under Option3 and Current Law ($1,770
Partially Refundable Child TaxCredit)
of option 2 so that families withincomes between $20,000 and $60,000
would get nearly thesame tax benefits as those at incomes of$10,000 or $70,000. It would operate identicallyto option 1 with a higher benefit
levelthe new credit wouldreplace the child exemption andchild credit. Persons below $10,000would qualify only for the EITC.The
maximum refund would be the EITCor the child credit, whichever is
more. This plan is illustrated in Figure 14,and its impact on marginaltax rates in Figure 15.
7.4 Option 4: No EITCPhaseout until Higher Incomes
The simplest and most completeway to end the middle-class parent
penalty would be to eliminate theexemption and child tax credit, and
simply not allow the EITCto phase out at all until family incomereaches
$110,000 and then phase it downto $1,000 per child. Thusany families
with earnings above the EITCmaximum would receive the full benefit.
This plan is illustrated in Figures16 and 17.
7.5 Option 5: A Three-StepRefundable Working-FamilyTax
Credit Integrated into the TaxCode
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FIGURE 15. Marginal Tax Ratefor Married Couple with TwoChil-
dren under Option 3 and CurrentLaw ($1,770 PartiallyRefundable
Child Tax Credit)
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FIGURE 16. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having Two
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FIGURE 17. Marginal Tax Rate forMarried Couple with Two Chil-
dren under Option 4 and Current Law(Extend EITC)
lower cost. This option would replace thechild credit, dependentexemp-
tion, and EITC with a working-familytax credit that phases in like the
EJTC and then has three stepsas illustrated in Figure 18. The first step
would be for low-income working families,with benefits phasing in in
the same way as the current EITC, andwould reach the same maximums
for families with one or two children($2,312 for one child, $3,816 for two
children). For low-income families withmore than two children, a third
tier would be added to the old EITC witha phase-in rate of 46 percent
and a maximum benefit of $4,300.Once a family's income reaches this
first plateau, benefits would remainconstant until the family's income
reached $18,000, when they would declineat a 10-percent phasedown
rate to a level of $1,500 per child for the firsttwo children, and $1,270 for
each additional child. Then, when incomereached $110,000, the benefit
would phase down at a 5-percentrate to the third tier of $1,000per child.
Under this plan the three key child benefitswould be integrated intoa
relatively simple three-step benefitstructure with benefits for every tax-
payer that are as high as or higher than benefits undercurrent law. The
resulting marginal tax ratesare shown in Figure 19.
7.6 Evaluation of the Options
Table 5 provides a summary of thecost and other impacts of the five
reform options. Current-law child benefits(from dependent exemp-
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FIGURE 18. 1999 Tax BenefitsAssociated with Having Two











FIGURE 19. Marginal Tax Rate forMarried Couple with Two Chil-
dren under Option 5 and CurrentLaw (Three-Step Working-FamilyTax
Credit)
1jctirent Law Marginal Rates




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tions, the EITC, and thechild credit) total $85 billion. Thefirst columns
of numbers in Table 5provides a summary of the additionalcosts associ-
ated with each plan for Fl2001. All significantly increasethe total cost
of child benefits. Notsurprisingly, option 3 (a $1,770partially refundable
credit) and option 4 (extendingthe EITC) are the mostexpensive, be-
cause their benefits arethe most expansive. In contrast,option 1 (a
$1,270-per-child partially refundablecredit) costs only $15.8 billion per
year; option 2(raising the child credit to$1,000 per child) costs $20
bfflion per year, and option 5(the three-step refundableworking-family
tax credit) costs $27.5bfflion per year.
The next column of Table 5summarizes the impact of the plans onthe
marginal tax rates of low- andmiddle-income taxpayers withchildren.
Under current law, 19.4 percentof families with children andAGI below
$40,000 face marginal federalpersonal income tax rates of 30 percent or
more, and 38.2 percentface rates of 20 percent or more.The first reform,
replacing the child credit anddependent exemption with a$1,270-per-
child partially refundable taxcredit, reduces this share withmarginal tax
rates above 30 percent bynearly 40 percent, to 12 percent.Expanding the
existing child credit from $500 to$1,000 per child under option 2reduces
the fraction of these taxpayerswith marginal tax rates above 30percent
even further, to 10.4percent.
The three plans presented inthe last three rows accomplish even
more. The $1,770-child-creditoption reduces the shareof these tax-
payers facing veryhigh marginal tax rates to 6percent, a reduction of
two-thirds compared to currentlaw Eliminating the EITCphase-out
reduces the share to 4 percent.Note that these last two optionsgreatly
reduce the fraction of taxpayerswith marginal tax rates between20 and
30 percent as well. In theno-EITC-phaseOUt option, 89 percentof taxpay-
ers with childrenand incomes below $40,000 havemarginal tax rates
below 20 percent, comparedwith only 62 percent under currentlaw.
The last option, the three-steprefundable credit, is as successful atreduc-
ing the share of taxpayerswith marginal tax rates above 30percent as the
two previous options, eventhough it costs only $28 billion.However, it
does less to reduce the shareof taxpayers with marginal taxrates be-
tween 20 and 30 percentthan the more expensiveoptions do.
The next column of Table 5summarizes each option's impact on mar-
riage penalties. We focus onmarriage penalties for familiesin the
$20,000$35,000 range where the womanearns 50 percentof the house-
hold income, because this iswhere the plans have their mostsignificant
differences. Further detailsof the impact on marriagepenalties for other
types of families areavailable in Table 6. Under currentlaw, a married
couple with two children inwhich each spouse earns$17,500 faces aThe Middle-Class Parent Penalty35
TABLE 6
1999 Total Marriage Rewards and Penaltiesunder Alternative Options




Marriage reward at percentage of income
earned by woman
0% 25% 50% 75%100%
$12,000Current law 4,5592,814 1,092-14 0 1: $1,270 flat credit 4,5592,8141,092 -14 0
2: $1,000 existing child
credit
4,5592,8141,092 -14 0
3: $1,770 flat credit 4,5592,814 1,092-14 435 4: Extend EITC 4,5592,814 1,092 -14 435 5: Three-step tax credit4,559 2,814 1,092 -14 435
$20,000Current law 4,171 1,421-1,163-1,400 0 1: $1,270 flat credit 4,171 1,421-1,028-1,400 0 2: $1,000 existing child
credit
4,171 1,421-1,163-1,400 0
3: $1,770 flat credit 4,388 1,638-812-1,183217
4: Extend EJTC 4,664 1,914-536-557 540 5: Three-step tax credit4,464 1,714-736-757 540
$35,000Current law 2,959-2,140-2,707-1,543 540
1: $1,270 flat credit 3,674-1,425-1,992-1,543 540
2: $1,000 existing child
credit
3,959-1,140-1,707-1,291 540
3: $1,770 flat credit 4,674-425-992-631 540 4: Extend EITC 4,950-149-518-631 540 5: Three-step tax credit 4,134-965-1,334-631 540
$50,000Current law 4,909-2,399-1,693-518 651
1: $1,270 flat credit 5,624-1,684-1,538-5181,366
2: $1,000 existing child
credit
5,909-1,399-1,253-518 651
3: $1,770 flat credit 6,624-684-538-5181,366 4: Extend EJTC 6,900 94-518-5181,366
5: Three-step tax credit 6,084-723-634-5181,366
$75,000Current law 6,536-1,370-1,694-1,3822,113
1: $1,270 flat credit 6,536-1,370-2,409-1,3822,113
2: $1,000 existing child
credit
7,536-370-1,694-1,3822,113
3: $1,770 flat credit 7,536-370-2,409-1,3822,113 4: Extend EITC 7,812 29-2,409-1,3822,113
5: Three-step tax credit6,996-713-2,409-1,3822,11336Eliwood & Liebman
marriage penalty of $2,707. Options1 and 2 reduce this by about one-
third, to $1,992 and $1,707respectively. Options 3 and 4 go muchfur-
ther, reducing marriage penaltiesto $992 and $518. Given the patternof
benefits, this should come as nosurprise. The less the difference be-
tween the maximum valueof the EITC and the value of childbenefits for
moderate-income families, thesmaller the marriage penalty, and these
two options show little or nofall in benefits as one moves from low to
moderate incomes. Finally, option 5(the three-step working-family tax
credit) performs reasonably well here.While it does not reduce marriage
penalties as much as the mostexpensive options, it reduces themfar
more dramatically thanthe $1,270 flat credit or the expansionof the child
credit to $1,000.28
Figure 20 shows the distributionof dollars spent under these options
by AGI. In most of the plans,the bulk of the dollars go to taxpayers
with incomes between $15,000and $75,000. The main exception is op-
tion 2 (raising the child credit to$1,000) and to a lesser extent the
closely related option 3, whichtransfer substantial fractions of their
dollars to taxpayers with incomesabove $75,000. The distributional
impacts of these plans issummarized in the last column of Table 5,
which shows the proportion ofbenefits going to families with AGI
below $50,000 and the proportiongoing to families with AGI below
$35,000. Under current law, 62 percentof child tax benefits go to fami-
lies with incomes below$50,000, while 51 percent go to familiesbelow
$35,000. Option 1 (the$1,270-per-child refundable credit) and option5
(the three-step credit) providealmost as high a share of theirbenefits to
families with incomes below$50,000 as under current law(though
much smaller shares to taxpayersunder $35,000). In contrast, option2
(raise the child credit to$1,000) provides only 41 percent of itsbenefits
to families with incomesbelow $50,000 and only 19 percent tofamilies
with incomes below $35,000. Options3 and 4 are somewhere inthe
middle, providing more dollars tolow- and middle-income families
than option 2, but less than options1 and 5.
One obvious result here isthat the greater the benefits given to
moderate-income parents, the betterthese plans perform in reducing
tax rates and marriagepenalties. The extreme plan, simplyextending
the EITC all the way to$110,000 in AGI, virtually eliminatesthe ad-
verse incentives. Butof course, the plans thataccomplish the most are
also the most expensive.
Note that in the more detailed Table 6there are a few circumstances wheremarriage
penalties rise slightly for some higher-incomecouples. For them the rising child benefits
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The combination of child taxbenefits creates a U-shaped benefit pattern
by income. The U shape ariseslargely from the introduction of new
supports for low-incomeworking families in recent yearsthat are cred-
ited with significantly increasingthe work of low-income workers.But
they also create a middle-class parentpenalty that creates high marginal
tax rates and sizablemarriage penalties for some families.
The obvious way to reduce theparent penalty is to increase the tax
benefits associated with childrenfor middle-income families. This ap-
proach leads to significant benefits inincentives and equity, but since this
is the densest part of the incomedistribution, such plans are expensive.
If the nation considers an expansionof the child tax credit to $1,000, as
has been suggested by somein Congress and by George W.Bush, then
making it partially refundable byconverting it to a flat $1,770 creditand
eliminating the child exemptionswifi target more of the benefits on
middle-income taxpayers and moresignificantly reduce high marginal tax
rates and marriage penaltiesfor low- to moderate-income families.Other,
less costly options, includingthe replacement of the current setof child-
related benefits with a three-stepworking-family tax credit, would signifi-
cantly reduce marginal tax ratesand marriage penalties at a lower cost.
Inevitably, deciding on the priority weshould assign to reducing the
middle-class parent penalty wifi depend onperceptions of fairness, po-
litical priorities, and estimated impacts onincentives. At the current time
the adverse tax rates andmarriage penalties have not beenshown to
create major distortions inbehavior in work or marriage in theseincome
ranges. In contrast,the positive work incentivescreated by the EITC
seem clearly to haveincreased work by low-income workers,especially
single parents. Some mayconclude that alleviating the middle-class par-
ent penalty is not worththe cost. If large tax cuts areseriously consid-
ered, however, the optionsdiscussed in this paper not onlywould be
targeted on middle-class families,but also would significantly reduce
adverse incentives while maintainingthe positive work incentivesfor
low-income workers.
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